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Abstract. From 03.01.05 to 07.01.05, the Dagstuhl Seminar 05011 Com-
puting and Markets was held in the International Conference and Re-
search Center (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl. During the seminar, several par-
ticipants presented their current research, and ongoing work and open
problems were discussed. Abstracts of the presentations given during the
seminar as well as abstracts of seminar results and ideas are put together
in this paper. The ﬁrst section describes the seminar topics and goals in
general. Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if avail-
able.
Keywords. Algorithms, complexity, game theory, social choice, auc-
tions, equilibrium
05011 Executive Summary  Computing and Markets
The seminar Computing and Markets facilitated a very fruitful interaction be-
tween economists and computer scientists, which intensiﬁed the understanding
of the other disciplines' tool sets. The seminar helped to pave the way to a
uniﬁed theory of markets that takes into account both the economic and the
computational issuesand their deep interaction.
Keywords: Algorithms, complexity, game theory, social choice, auctions, equi-
librium
Joint work of: Lehmann, Daniel; Müller, Rudolf; Sandholm, Tuomas
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/224
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 05011
Computing and Markets
http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/225
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The PageRank Axioms
Alon Altman (Technion - Haifa, IL)
This talk introduces the ﬁrst graph-theoretic, ordinal representation theorem for
the PageRank algorithm, bridging the gap between page ranking algorithms and
the formal theory of social choice.
Keywords: Pagerank, social choice, ranking system
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/197
The Value of Correlation in Strategic Form Games
Itai Ashlagi (Technion - Haifa, IL)
Every game in strategic form can be extended by adding a correlation device.
Any Equilibrium in such an extended game is called a correlated equilibrium
(Aumann 1974).
Aumann showed that there exist games, where the agents' surplus in a cor-
related equilibrium is greater than their surplus in every equilibrium.
This suggests the study of two major measures for the value of correlation:
1. The ratio between the maximal surplus obtained in an correlated equilibrium
to the maximal surplus obtained in equilibrium.
We refer to this ratio as the mediation value. 2. The ratio between the optimal
surplus to the maximal surplus obtained in correlated equilibrium.
We refer to this ratio as the enforcement value.
In this work we initiate the study of the mediation value and of the en-
forcement value, providing several general results on the value of correlation as
captured by these concepts.
We also present a set of results for the more specialized case of congestion
games, a class of games that received a lot attention in the recent computer
science and e-commerce communities.
Indeed, while much work in computer science has been devoted to the study
of the ratio between the surplus in optimal strategies to the surplus in the worst
Nash equilibrium (the so called "price of anarchy") for congestion games, our
work presents and initiates the study of two other complementary measures.
Keywords: Correlation, mediation, enforcement, equilibrium, mediator
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/231
Joint work of: Ashlagi, Itai; Monderer, Dov; Tenneholtz, Moshe
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Single-Parameter Domains and Implementation in
Undominated Strategies
Moshe Babaioﬀ (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
This paper studies Algorithmic Mechanism Design where the bidders are single-
parameter (have the same private value for all desired outcomes), with a focus
on Combinatorial Auctions (CA).
We study four variants of the CA model: where each player desires a sin-
gle bundle (single-minded) or he desires several bundles (multi-minded), and
where the desired bundles are public information known) or private information
(unknown).
We provide several mechanisms and examples in these settings.
Our ﬁrst main result is a general technique to convert any algorithm to a
truthful ascending mechanism for knowndomains (not only for CA).
For the known single-minded CA domain, it almost preserves the approxi-
mation ratio of the original algorithm.
Our second main result provides the ﬁrst computationally eﬃcient mech-
anism for the case of unknown single-parameter multi-minded bidders, with
close to optimal welfare approximation.
This mechanism also works in general, non single-parameter, combinatorial
auctions, with some additional approximation loss.
This mechanism is a computationally feasible implementation in undominated
strategies, a notion that we deﬁne and justify, and which we believe is of inde-
pendent interest.
Keywords: Mechanism Design; Combinatorial Auctions; Welfare Approxima-
tion; Implementation in Undominated Strategies
Joint work of: Babaioﬀ, Moshe; Ron Lavi; Elan Pavlov
Substitutes valuations are M#-concave
Alejandro Bertelsen (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
The (gross-) substitutes property plays a central role in the study of exchange
economies of indivisible goods and matching between a set of agents and a set
of goods. Kelso and Crawford (1982) introduced this property and showed that
if all agents' valuations are substitutes, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium.
Fujishige and Yang (2003) characterized substitutes valuations as M-natural-
concave functions: a characterization of substitutes valuations that does not
involve prices and is convenient for algorithmic purposes. Their proof is based
on the work of Murota and al. on convex discrete analysis. We present a stronger
characterization of substitutes valuations whose proof is elementary. Apart from
the novelty of the proof, a strengthening of the concavity condition is obtained,
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enabling us to present a new algorithm for the maximization of M#-concave
functions. Our algorithm, given a substitutes valuation and a price vector, ﬁnds
a preferred set using only with k*n evaluations of the valuation function, where k
is the minimal size of a preferred set and n the number of items. This algorithm
can be used, for example, to implement eﬃciently the demand-set oracle in terms
of the value oracle.
Keywords: Gross-substitutes, M-concave, demand oracle
On the Computational Power of Iterative Auctions:
Ascending Auctions
Liad Blumrosen (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
We embark on a systematic analysis of the power and limitations of iterative
ascending-price combinatorial auctions. We prove a large number of results show-
ing the boundaries of what can be achieved by diﬀerent types of ascending auc-
tions: item prices vs. bundle prices, anonymous prices vs. personalized prices,
deterministic vs. non-deterministic, ascending vs. descending, preference elicita-
tion vs. full elicitation, adaptive vs. non-adaptive, and single trajectory vs. multi
trajectory.
Two of our main results show that neither ascending item-price auctions nor
ascending anonymous bundle-price auctions can determine the optimal allocation
among general valuations. This justiﬁes the use of personalized bundle prices in
iterative combinatorial auctions like the FCC spectrum auctions.
Keywords: Combinatorial auctions, iterative auctions, ascending auctions, com-
munication
Joint work of: Blumrosen, Liad; Nisan, Noam
Near-Optimal Online Auctions
Avrim Blum (CMU - Pittsburgh, USA)
We consider the online auction problem proposed by Bar-Yossef, Hildrum, and
Wu 2002 in which an auctioneer is selling identical items to bidders arriving one
at a time. We give an auction that achieves a constant factor of the proﬁt of the
optimal ﬁxed-price auction, minus an O(h) additive loss term, where h is the
value of the highest bid.
Furthermore, this auction does not require foreknowledge of the range of
bidders' valuations. On both counts, this answers open questions from BHW-02
and BKRW-03. We achieve our results by adapting an algorithm of Kalai for the
problem of "online learning from expert advice", that is especially well-suited to
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the auction setting. We further improve on the results from BKRW-03 for the
online posted-price problem (the seller proposes a price and only sees whether
the buyer purchased or not, but does not get to see his bid value). Finally,
we give a number of extensions: to competing against the optimal auction that
may change prices a "few" times, and to attribute-auctions for 1-dimensional
attributes.
Joint work of: Blum, Avrim; Hartline, Jason
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions
Felix Brandt (Stanford University, USA)
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the com-
mon assumption of self-interest, maximize the weighted diﬀerence of their own
proﬁt and their competitors' proﬁt. This assumption is motivated by inherent
spitefulness, or, for example, by competitive scenarios such as in closed mar-
kets where the loss of a competitor will likely result in future gains for oneself.
We derive symmetric Bayes Nash equilibria for spiteful agents in ﬁrst-price and
second-price sealed-bid auctions. In ﬁrst-price auctions, bidders become "more
truthful" the more spiteful they are. Surprisingly, the equilibrium strategy in
second-price auctions does not depend on the number of bidders. Based on these
equilibria, we compare revenue in both auction types. It turns out that expected
revenue in second-price auctions is higher than expected revenue in ﬁrst-price
auctions whenever agents have the slightest interest in reducing others' proﬁt as
long as they still care for their own proﬁt. In other words, revenue equivalence
only holds for auctions in which all agents are either self-interested or completely
malicious.
Keywords: Auctions, Externalities, Spite, Revenue
Joint work of: Brandt, Felix; Sandholm, Tuomas; Shoham, Yoav
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/198
Expressive Negotiation over Donations to Charities
Vincent Conitzer (CMU - Pittsburgh, USA)
When donating money to a (say, charitable) cause, it is possible to use the con-
templated donation as negotiating material to induce other parties interested in
the charity to donate more. Such negotiation is usually done in terms of match-
ing oﬀers, where one party promises to pay a certain amount if others pay a
certain amount. However, in their current form, matching oﬀers allow for only
limited negotiation. For one, it is not immediately clear how multiple parties can
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make matching oﬀers at the same time without creating circular dependencies.
Also, it is not immediately clear how to make a donation conditional on other
donations to multiple charities, when the donator has diﬀerent levels of appreci-
ation for the diﬀerent charities. In both these cases, the limited expressiveness of
matching oﬀers causes economic loss: it may happen that an arrangement that
would have made all parties (donators as well as charities) better oﬀ cannot be
expressed in terms of matching oﬀers and will therefore not occur.
In this paper, we introduce a bidding language for expressing very general
types of matching oﬀers over multiple charities. We formulate the correspond-
ing clearing problem (deciding how much each bidder pays, and how much each
charity receives), and show that it is NP-complete to approximate to any ratio
even in very restricted settings. We give a mixed-integer program formulation
of the clearing problem, and show that for concave bids, the program reduces
to a linear program. We then show that the clearing problem for a subclass
of concave bids is at least as hard as the decision variant of linear program-
ming. Subsequently, we show that the clearing problem is much easier when bids
are quasilinearfor surplus, the problem decomposes across charities, and for
payment maximization, a greedy approach is optimal if the bids are concave
(although this latter problem is weakly NP-complete when the bids are not con-
cave). For the quasilinear setting, we study the mechanism design question. We
show that an ex-post eﬃcient mechanism is impossible even with only one char-
ity and a very restricted class of bids. We also show that there may be beneﬁts
to linking the charities from a mechanism design standpoint.
Keywords: Expressive Negotiation, Charities, Public Goods, Externalities
Joint work of: Conitzer, Vincent; Sandholm, Tuomas
The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial
Auction Design
Peter Cramton (University of Maryland, USA)
We propose the clock-proxy auction as a practical means for auctioning many
related items. A clock auction phase is followed by a last-and-ﬁnal proxy round.
The approach combines the simple and transparent price discovery of the clock
auction with the eﬃciency of the proxy auction. Linear pricing is maintained
as long as possible, but then is abandoned in the proxy round to improve ef-
ﬁciency and enhance seller revenues. The approach has many advantages over
the simultaneous ascending auction. In particular, the clock-proxy auction has
no exposure problem, eliminates incentives for demand reduction, and prevents
most collusive bidding strategies.
Keywords: Auction, clock auction, combinatorial auction, package auction,
proxy auction
Joint work of: Cramton, Peter; Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Milgrom, Paul
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Fair Payments for Eﬃcient Allocations in Public Sector
Combinatorial Auctions
Robert Day (Univ. of Connecticut, USA)
Motivated by the increasing use of auctions by government agencies, we consider
the problem of fairly pricing public goods in a combinatorial auction. A well-
known problem with the incentive-compatible Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
auction mechanism is that the resulting prices may not be in the core. Loosely
speaking, this means the payments of the winners could be so low, that there
are losing bidders who would have been willing to pay more than the payments
of the winning bidders.
Clearly, this unfair outcome is unacceptable for a public-sector auction.
Proxy-based combinatorial auctions, in which each bidder submits several pack-
age bids to a proxy, result in eﬃcient outcomes and bidder-Pareto-optimal core-
payments by winners, thus oﬀering a viable practical alternative to address this
problem.
This paper confronts two critical issues facing the proxy-auction. First, mo-
tivated to minimize a bidder's ability to beneﬁt through strategic manipulation
(through collusive agreement or unilateral action), we demonstrate the strength
of a mechanism that minimizes total payments among all possible proxy auction
outcomes, narrowing the previously broad solution concept. Secondly, we address
the computational diﬃculties of achieving these outcomes with a constraint-
generation approach, promising to broaden the range of applications for which
the proxy-auction achieves a comfortably rapid solution.
Keywords: Auctions, core, bidder-Pareto-optimal, constraint generation, VCG
payments, proxy auctions, combinatorial auctions
Joint work of: Day, Robert; Raghavan, S.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/183
Selﬁsh Routing of Splittable Flow with Respect to
Maximum Congestion
Rainer Feldmann (Universität Paderborn, D)
We study the problem of selﬁshly routing splittable traﬃc with respect to max-
imum congestion through a shared network.
Our model naturally combines features of the two best studied models in
the context of selﬁsh routing: The KP-model [KP99] and the Wardrop-model
[War52].
We are given a network with source nodes si, sink nodes ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, m
edges, and a latency function for each edge. Traﬃcs of rate ri are destined from
si to ti.
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Traﬃcs are splittable and each piece of traﬃc tries to route in such a way
that it minimizes its private latency.
In the absence of a central regulation, Nash Equilibria represent stable states
of such a system. In a Nash Equilibrium, no piece of traﬃc can decrease its
private latency by unilaterally changing its route. The increased social cost due
to the lack of central regulation is deﬁned in terms of the coordination ratio, i.e.
the worst possible ratio of the social cost of a traﬃc ﬂow at Nash Equilibrium
and the social cost of a global optimal traﬃc ﬂow.
In this paper, we show that in the above model pure Nash Equilibria always
exist.
Then, we analyze the coordination ratio of single-commodity networks with
linear latency functions.
Our main result is a tight upper bound of 43m, where m is the number of
edges of the network, for the coordination ratio of single-commodity networks
with linear latency functions.
On our way to our main result we analyze the coordination ratio of single-hop
networks and show a tight upper bound of m + Θ(
√
m). A more sophisticated
analysis yields an upper bound of 43m for the coordination ratio of multi-hop
networks, which is then used to derive the main result for arbitrary single-
commodity linear networks.
Keywords: Selﬁsh routing, coordination ratio
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/199
The Price of Anarchy for Polynomial Social Cost
Martin Gairing (Universität Paderborn, D)
In this work, we consider an interesting variant of the well-studied KP model
[KP99] for selﬁsh routing that reﬂects some inﬂuence from the much older
Wardrop [War52]. In the new model, user traﬃcs are still unsplittable, while
social cost is now the expectation of the sum, over all links, of a certain polyno-
mial evaluated at the total latency incurred by all users choosing the link; we call
it polynomial social cost. The polynomials that we consider have non-negative
coeﬃcients.
We are interested in evaluating Nash equilibria in this model, and we use
the Price of Anarchy as our evaluation measure. We prove the Fully Mixed
Nash Equilibrium Conjecture for identical users and two links, and establish an
approximate version of the conjecture for arbitrary many links. Moreover, we
give upper bounds on the Price of Anarchy.
Keywords: Selﬁsh routing, KP-model, price of anarchy, fully mixed Nash Equi-
librium
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Joint work of: Gairing, Martin; Lücking, Thomas; Mavronicolas, Marios;
Monien, Burkhard
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/200
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Oﬀers: Near-Optimal
Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation
Andrew Gilpin (CMU - Pittsburgh, USA)
We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism
that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet gen-
erates close-to-optimal expected utility for the seller. We show that if each buyer
receives at most one oﬀer, each buyer's dominant strategy is to act truthfully.
In more general TLAs, the buyers' optimal strategies are more intricate, and
we derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the game. We develop algorithms
for ﬁnding the equilibrium and also for optimizing the oﬀers so as to maximize
the seller's expected utility. In several example settings we show that the seller's
expected utility already is close to optimal for a small number of oﬀers. As the
number of buyers increases, the seller's expected utility increases, and becomes
increasingly (but not monotonically) more competitive with Myerson's expected
utility maximizing auction.
Keywords: Optimal auction design, mechanism design, perfect Bayesian equi-
librium
Joint work of: Sandholm, Tuomas; Gilpin, Andrew
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/207
Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Issue
Bargaining
Henner Gimpel (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
Game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenously
given preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on. Preferences in these
models do not depend on the history of oﬀers made during a negotiation. This
paper argues that preferences are based on issue-wise reference points changing
during the bargaining process as result of the counterparty's oﬀers.
Keywords: Negotiation Analysis, Bilateral Bargaining, Consumer Preferences,
Behavioral Economics, Endowment Eﬀect, Loss Aversion
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/203
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Online Homogeneous Markets
Rica Gonen (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
We consider the problem of designing an online mechanism for homogeneous
markets where bidders each bid to buy or sell one unit of a single commod-
ity. As online mechanisms make their decisions on partial information they are
not economically eﬃcient. This important characteristic allows the online mar-
ket mechanisms to achieve Incentive Compatibility, Individual Rationality and
Budget Balance, attributes that can not simultaneously apply with optimal ef-
ﬁciency. We focus on an Incentive Compatible market that is IR and BB. This
mechanism approximates the optimal trade k by k−12 and approximates the op-
timal gain from trade m by
√
m. We show that the trade's approximation bound
is tight.
Joint work of: Gonen, Rica; Yair, Bartal
Derandomization of Auctions
Jason D. Hartline (Microsoft - Mountain View, USA)
We study the problem of designing seller optimal auctions. Prior to this work,
the only previously known auctions that are approximately optimal in worst case
employ randomization. Our main result is the existence of deterministic auctions
that approximately match the performance gaurantees of these randomized auc-
tions. We give a fairly general derandomization technique for turning any ran-
domized mechanism into an asymmetric deterministic one with approximately
the same properties. In doing so, we bypass an information theoretic impos-
sibility result for symmetric deterministic auctions and show that asymmetry
is nearly as powerful as randomization in optimal mechanism design problems.
Our construction involves solving an exponential-sized ﬂow problem and thus is
not polynomial-time computable. We show that for an interesting problem re-
lated to auctions, the 2-color-guessing problem, this derandomization can indeed
be performed in polynomial time. We leave as an open question the existence
of a polynomial-time computable deterministic auction that is approximately
optimal.
Keywords: Auctions, randomization
Joint work of: Aggarwal, Gagan; Fiat, Amos; Goldberg, Andrew V.; Hartline,
Jason D.; Immorlica, Nicole; Sudan, Madhu
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Network structure and strong equilibrium in route
selection games
Ron Holzman (Technion - Haifa, IL)
In a route selection game on a network, every player chooses a route from the
origin to the destination, which are common to all players. Costs are assigned to
road segments in the form of monotone nondecreasing functions of the number
of players who use them. Each player incurs a total cost equal to the sum of the
costs of the road segments in his route. It is known that such a game always has a
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Here we obtain a structural characterization
of those networks for which a strong equilibrium is guaranteed to exist regardless
of the cost assignment. The route selection games based on networks in this class
enjoy more stability as well as other desirable properties of equilibrium regarding
uniqueness and eﬃciency.
Keywords: Congestion games, Networks, Route selection games, Strong equi-
librium, Eﬃciency
Joint work of: Holzman, Ron; Law-yone(Lev-tov), Nissan
A Robust Open Ascending-price Multi-unit Auction
Protocol against False-name Bids and an Experimental
Examination
Atsushi Iwasaki (Kyushu University, J)
This research presents a ascending-price multi-unit auction protocol.
As far as the authors are aware, this is the ﬁrst protocol that has an open
format, and in which sincere bidding is an equilibrium strategy, even if the mar-
ginal utilities of each agent can increase and agents can submit false-name bids.
As ever-increasing numbers of companies and consumers are trading on Inter-
net auctions, a new type of cheating called false-name bids has been noticed.
Speciﬁcally, there may be some agents with ﬁctitious names such as multiple
e-mail addresses. The VCG is not an open format, and truth-telling is no longer
a dominant strategy if agents can submit false-name bids and the marginal util-
ities of each agent can increase. The Iterative Reducing (IR) protocol with a
sealed-bid format is robust against false-name bids, although it requires the auc-
tioneer to carefully pre-determine a reservation price for one unit. Open format
protocols, such as the Ausubel auction, outperform sealed-bid format protocols
in terms of the simplicity and privacy-preservation.
These two advantages are said to encourage more agents to bid sincerely and
to provide the seller with higher revenue. We extend the Ausubel auction to our
proposed protocol which can handle the cases where the marginal utilities of
each agent can increase.
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Moreover, it is robust against false-name bids and does not require the auc-
tioneer to set a reservation price. Our simulation result indicates that our proto-
col herein obtains a social surplus close to Pareto eﬃcient and that it outperforms
the IR with respect to the social surplus and the seller's revenue. Furthermore,
we evaluate the protocol employing subject experiments.
The experimental result suggests a segmentation which gives a seller a clue
as to which protocol he should choose in his business. It also show that our
protocol is more stable than a traditional and simple uniform-price auction in
terms of individual bidding behavior and the seller's revenue.
Keywords: Auctions, Mechanism Design, Electronic Commerce, Experimental
Economics
Joint work of: Iwasaki, Atsushi; Yokoo, Makoto
Approximate Utilitarian Mechanism Design via
Primal-Dual Method
Piotr Krysta (Universität Dortmund, D)
This work deals with the design of eﬃciently computable incentive compatible,
or truthful, mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with multi-
parameter agents. Our focus lies on the design of approximation algorithms for
NP-hard mechanism design problems. In order to ensure incentive compatibility,
approximation algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties.
The most eﬃcient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is LP-based
randomized rounding.
Unfortunately, this method is not monotone. We show that monotone primal-
dual greedy algorithms are capable of achieving almost the same approximation
ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. We demonstrate this technique based on
two intensively studied applications from mechanism design, namely combinato-
rial auctions and unsplittable ﬂow (routing). In both cases, we can signiﬁcantly
improve on the previously known approximation ratios for incentive compatible
mechanisms. For example, we obtain the ﬁrst incentive compatible mechanism
for routing in general networks that is capable of optimizing the network uti-
lizations up to constant factors, if edge capacities are suﬃciently large. The best
previous mechanism only achieved approximation factors logarithmic in the size
of the network.
Joint work of: Krysta, Piotr; Voecking, Berthold
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Negotiating over Bundles and Prices Using Online
Aggregate Knowledge
Han La Poutré (CWI - Amsterdam, NL)
We consider a form of multi-issue negotiation where a shop negotiates both the
contents and the price of bundles of goods with his customers. We present some
key insights about, as well as a procedure for, locating mutually beneﬁcial alter-
natives to the bundle currently under negotiation. The essence of our approach
lies in combining aggregate (anonymous) knowledge of customer preferences with
current data about the ongoing negotiation process. The developed procedure ei-
ther works with already obtained aggregate knowledge or, in the absence of such
knowledge, learns the relevant information online. We conduct computer experi-
ments with simulated customers that have nonlinear preferences. We show how,
for various types of customers, with distinct negotiation heuristics, our proce-
dure (with and without the necessary aggregate knowledge) increases the speed
with which deals are reached, as well as the number and the Pareto eﬃciency of
the deals reached compared to a benchmark.
Keywords: Negotiation, bundling, aggregate knowledge, non-linear preferences,
online learning
Many-to-many matching: the subset agreement problem
Daniel Lehmann (The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, IL)
How can two parties agree on some subset of a set of possible contracts? A
solution concept generalizing stable matchings is proposed.
Results concerning the existence of solutions and the structure of the set
of solutions are presented, under conditions that are weak enough to apply to
all previously known matching problems. Classical results about one-to-one and
many-to-one matchings are generalized to many-to-many matchings. This work
builds on recent work by Milgrom and by Alkan and Gale.
Keywords: Matching, Revealed Preferences, Choice Functions, Stable Match-
ings
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Game-Theoretic Graphical Models for Congestion
Kevin Leyton-Brown (University of British Columbia - Vancouver, CDN)
Game-Theoretic Graphical Models for Congestion Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Ten-
nenholtz, Moshe; Bhat, Navin A.R.
This talk will survey two graphical models which the authors have proposed
for compactly representing single-shot, ﬁnite-action games in which a large num-
ber of agents contend for scarce resources.
The ﬁrst model considered is Local-Eﬀect Games (LEGs). These games often
(but not always) have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Finding a potential function
is a good technique for ﬁnding such equilibria. We give a complete characteriza-
tion of which LEGs have potential functions and provide the functions in each
case; we also show a general case where pure-strategy equilibria exist in the
absence of potential functions.
Action-graph games (AGGs) are a fully expressive game representation which
can compactly express both strict and context-speciﬁc independence between
players' utility functions, and which generalize LEGs. We present algorithms
for computing both symmetric and arbitrary equilibria of AGGs, based on a
continuation method proposed by Govindan and Wilson. We analyze the worst-
case cost of computing the Jacobian of the payoﬀ function, the exponential- time
bottleneck step of this algorithm, and in all cases achieve exponential speedup.
When the indegree of G is bounded by a constant and the game is symmetric,
the Jacobian can be computed in polynomial time.
Keywords: Compact representation of games, congestion games, local-eﬀect
games, action-graph games
Joint work of: Leyton-Brown, Kevin; Tennenholtz, Moshe; Bhat, Navin A.R.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/219
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/220
Self-Conﬁrming Price Prediction for Bidding in
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
Jeﬀrey MacKie-Mason (University of Michigan, USA)
Simultaneous, separate ascending auctions are ubiquitous, even when agents have
preferences over combinations of goods, from which arises the exposure problem.
Little is known about strategies that perform well when the exposure problem
is important. We present a new family of bidding strategies for this situation, in
which agents form and utilize various amounts of information from predictions
of the distribution of ﬁnal prices.
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The predictor strategies we deﬁne diﬀer in their choice of method for gener-
ating the initial (pre-auction) prediction. We explore several methods, but focus
on self-conﬁrming predictions. An agent's prediction of characteristics of the dis-
tribution of closing prices is self-conﬁrming if, when all agents follow the same
predictor bidding strategy, the ﬁnal price distributions that actually result are
consistent with the utilized characteristics of the prediction.
We extensively analyze an auction environment with ﬁve goods, and ﬁve
agents who each can choose from 53 diﬀerent bidding strategies (resulting in
over 4.2 million distinct strategy combinations). We ﬁnd that the self-conﬁrming
distribution predictor is a highly stable, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. We have
been unable to ﬁnd any other Nash strategies in this environment.
In limited experiments in other environments the self-conﬁrming distribution
predictor consistently performs well, but is not generally a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium.
Keywords: Computational markets; auctions; bidding strategies
Joint work of: Osepayshvili, Anna; Wellman, Michael; Reeves, Daniel; MacKie-
Mason, Jeﬀrey
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/202
Attribute Auctions
Yishay Mansour (Tel Aviv University, IL)
In an "attribute auction", a seller (auctioneer) is marketing some good of unlim-
ited supply to n bidders, each of whom has a set of public attributes. The goal
of the seller is to achieve a revenue competitive with the best pricing function in
some given class of functions over the attributes. This setting was introduced in
[BH-05], where the special case of 1-dimensional real-valued attributes was con-
sidered, and results were given for the comparison class of piecewise-constant
functions with k pieces.
In this paper, we consider attribute auctions more generally, and show a
natural strategy by which an auctioneer can perform nearly as well as the best
pricing scheme in any given class, so long as the number of bidders is large
enough as a function of an appropriate measure of the complexity of the class.
We do this by making a natural connection to the notion of sample-complexity in
machine learning, though from a learning perspective the auction setting presents
certain unique challenges: in particular, the loss function is discontinuous and
asymmetric, and the range of bid values may be large. We also consider a partial-
information setting in which the auctioneer only gets information by making
oﬀers that are either accepted or rejected, and provide bounds for that case as
well.
Joint work of: Balcan, Maria-Florina ; Blum, Avrim ; Hartline, Jason D.;
Mansour, Yishay
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Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on
Processing Times
Benny Moldovanu (Universität Bonn, D)
We study a model where randomly arriving customers bid for places in a queue.
The agents are privately informed about their own processing times. We de-
rive steady-state bidding equilibria, and relate these equilibria to the "shortest
(longest) processing time ﬁrst" queue disciplines. A crucial role in our analyis
is played by the convexity/concavity of the function measuring the cost of de-
lay. For polynomial cost functions, Laplace-transform computations allow for for
closed-form, explicit solutions.
Joint work of: Moldovanu, Benny; Kittsteiner, T.
Generalized Congestion Games
Dov Monderer (Technion - Haifa, IL)
The papers has three parts.
In part 1 it is proved that every game in strategic form is isomorphic to an AS-
congestion game  A congestion game with agent-speciﬁc payoﬀs. In this part
I also give a classiﬁcation of congestion models and characterization results. In
particular we generalize the results of Rosenthal and of Monderer and Shapley
regarding the equivalence of potential games and congestion games.
In part 2 I discuss congestion models deﬁned by solution concepts of cooperative
game theory. I use it to characterize the Shapley value and indeed all semivalues.
In part 3 the previous results are applied to combinatorial auctions with strate-
gic goods.
On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for
Partially Informed Environments
Ahuva Mu'alem (Hebrew University, IL)
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations.
The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mech-
anisms and computationally eﬃcient mechanisms for severely restricted players
(single-parameter domains). As it turns out, many natural social goals cannot
be implemented using the dominant-strategy concept. This suggests that the
standard requirements must be relaxed in order to construct general-purpose
mechanisms.
We observe that in many common distributed environments computational
entities can take advantage of the network structure to collect and distribute
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information. We thus suggest a notion of partially informed environments. Even
if the information is recorded with some probability, this enables us to implement
a wider range of social goals, using the concept of iterative elimination of weakly
dominated strategies. As a result, cooperation is achieved independent of agents'
belief. As a case study, we apply our methods to derive Peer-to-Peer network
mechanism for ﬁle sharing.
See also: On Decentralized Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Partially In-
formed Environments, In EC-05
Fundamentals in Discrete Convex Analysis
Kazuo Murota (University of Tokyo, J)
This talk describes fundamental properties of M-convex and L-convex functions
that play the central roles in discrete convex analysis. These concepts were orig-
inally introduced in combinatorial optimization, but turned out to be relevant
in economics. Emphasis is put on discrete duality and conjugacy respect to the
Legendre-Fenchel transformation.
Monograph information:
http://www.misojiro.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp/∼murota/mybooks.html#DCAsiam2003
Keywords: Gross substitute, discrete convex functions, M-convex function,
Fenchel-Legendre transformation
Joint work of: Murota, Kazuo
Extended Abstract: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/216
Dominant Strategy Mechanisms with Multidimensional
Types
Rudolf Müller (Maastricht University, NL)
This paper provides a characterization of dominant strategy mechanisms with
quasi-linear utilities and multi-dimensional types for a variety of preference do-
mains. These characterizations are in terms of a monotonicity property on the
underlying allocation rule.
Keywords: Dominant Strategy, Farkas Lemma, Combinatorial Auctions
Joint work of: Hongwei Gui; Müller, Rudolf; Vohra, Rakesh V.
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/210
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Congestion games with failures
Maria Polukarov (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs),
which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a
CGF agents share a common set of facilities (service providers), where each ser-
vice provider (SP) may fail with some known probability. For reliability reasons,
an agent may choose a subset of the SPs in order to try and perform his task.
The cost of an agent for utilizing any SP is an agent-speciﬁc function of the total
number of agents using this SP. A main feature of this setting is that the cost
for an agent for successful completion of his task is the minimum of the costs of
his successful attempts. We show that although congestion games with failures
do not admit a potential function, and thus are not isomorphic to classic conges-
tion games, they always possess a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, an
eﬃcient algorithm for the construction of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium pro-
ﬁle is presented. We also show that the SPs' congestion experienced in diﬀerent
Nash equilibria is (almost) unique. For the subclass of symmetric CGFs we give
a characterization of best and worst Nash equilibria, present algorithms for their
construction, and compare the social disutilities of the agents at these points.
Keywords: Congestion games, Failures, Pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
Joint work of: Penn, Michal; Polukarov, Maria; Tennenholtz, Moshe
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/209
Towards Generic Low Payment Mechanisms for
Decentralized Task Allocation
Amir Ronen (Technion - Haifa, IL)
Situations in which a set of tasks is to be allocated among self-interested agents
occur in many domains. Among the examples are electronic commerce applica-
tions, protocols for task allocation over the Internet, multi agent systems, etc. In
this talk I will focus on the problem of procuring a cheap path in a disjoint path
graph in which the edges belong to self interested agents (SDP). I will show that
many decentralized task allocation problems can be reduced to SDPs. After that
I will analyze two types of mechanisms (protocols) for the problem, incentive
compatible and non incentive compatible, and describe the diﬀerences among
their properties. (For the analysis of non incentive compatible mechanisms I will
present an approach which is based on reinforcement learning.) Finally, I will
describe how to combine the virtues of both types of mechanisms.
Keywords: Mechanism design, theory, computer science, economics
Joint work of: Ronen, Amir; Czumaj, Artur; Talisman, Rina
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Equilibrium Prices in Markets Modeled with Mixed
Integer Programs
Michael H. Rothkopf (Rutgers Univ. - Piscataway, USA)
Dual variables give useful prices in markets models with LPs. However, many
markets have important economies of scale such as ﬁxed or start up costs. These
markets can be modeled using mixed integer programs (MIPs). Ever since Go-
mory and Baumol examined the dual of cutting planes in MIPs in 1960, we
have "known" that there are no economically satisfactory prices for markets
modeled with MIPs. In 1990 and 1994, Yale professor Herbert Scarf explained
and lamented the problem in Operations Research and in the widely circulated
Journal of Economic Perspectives.
We have found a simple way to get prices that support an economic equilib-
rium.
The key is pricing the discrete variables as well as the continuous ones. We do
this in two stages. First we solve the MIP. Then, we add linear constraints that
force the optimal solution and drop the integrality constraints. We show that
the dual variables on the added constraints in the resulting LP eﬀectively price
the integer variables and that the dual prices support an economic equilibrium.
In particular, we exhibit equilibrium- supporting prices for the example problem
Scarf used to explain the problem to economists. In addition to their theoretical
importance, our results have immediate practical relevance to electricity auctions
where generators have start up costs and minimum run level constraints.
Joint work of: Richard P. O'Neill, Paul M. Sotkiewicz, Benjamin F. Hobbs,
Rothkopf, Michael H., and William R. Stewart, Jr.
See also: Richard P. O'Neill, Paul M. Sotkiewicz, Benjamin F. Hobbs, Michael
H. Rothkopf, and William R. Stewart, Jr., Eﬃcient Market-Clearing Prices in
Markets with Nonconvexities, William R. Stewart, Jr., Eﬃcient Market-Clearing
Prices in Markets with Nonconvexities, European Journal of Operations Re-
search 164, pp 269-285, 2005.
Automated Mechanism Design
Tuomas Sandholm (CMU - Pittsburgh, USA)
Mechanisms design has traditionally been a manual endeavor. In 2002, Conitzer
and Sandholm introduced the automated mechanism design (AMD) approach,
where the mechanism is computationally created for the speciﬁc problem in-
stance at hand. This has several advantages: 1) it can yield better mechanisms
than the ones known to date, 2) it applies beyond the problem classes studied
manually to date, 3) it can circumvent seminal economic impossibility results
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that hold for classes of problems but not all instances, and 4) it shifts the bur-
den of design from man to machine. In this talk I will overview our results on
AMD to date. I will cover problem representations and the computational com-
plexity of diﬀerent variants of the design problem. Initial applications include
revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions and (combinatorial) public goods
problems. Algorithms for AMD will be discussed. To reduce the computational
complexity of designing optimal combinatorial auctions, I introduce an incentive
compatible, individually rational subfamily called Virtual Valuations Combina-
torial Auctions. The auction mechanism's revenue can be boosted (started, for
example, from the VCG) by hill-climbing in this subspace. I will also present
computational complexity and communication complexity results that motivate
multi-stage and non-truth-promoting mechanisms. Finally, I present our ﬁrst
steps toward automatically designing multi-stage mechanisms.
Keywords: Automated mechanism design, mechanism design.
Joint work of: Sandholm, Tuomas; Conitzer, Vincent; Likhodedov, Anton;
Boutilier, Craig
Overcoming Free Riding in Multi-Party Computations
Rann Smordinsky (Technion - Haifa, IL)
This paper addresses the question of multi party computation in a model with
asymmetric information. Each agent has a private value (secret), but in contrast
to standard models, the agent incurs a cost when retrieving the secret. There
is a social choice function the agents would like to compute and implement. All
agents would like to perform a joint computation, which input is their vector of
secrets. However, agents would like to free-ride on others' contribution.
A mechanism which elicits players' secrets and performs the desired compu-
tation deﬁnes a game. A mechanism is `appropriate' if it (weakly) implements the
social choice function for all secret vectors. namely, if there exists an equilibrium
in which it is able to elicit (suﬃciently many) agents' secrets and perform the
computation, for all possible secret vectors. We show that `appropriate' mech-
anisms approach agents sequentially and that they have low communication
complexity.
Keywords: Multi-party computation, equilibrium, mechanism-design
Joint work of: Smordinsky, Rann; Tennenholtz, Moshe
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/206
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A Contract and Balancing Mechanism for Sharing
Capacity in a Communication Network
Richard Steinberg (Cambridge University, GB)
We propose a method for determining how much to charge users of a communica-
tion network when they share bandwidth. Our approach can be employed either
when a network owner wishes to sell bandwidth for a speciﬁed period of time to
a number of diﬀerent users, or when users cooperate to build a network to be
shared among themselves. We show how a Contract and Balancing Mechanism
can be deﬁned to mediate between rapidly ﬂuctuating prices and the longer time
scales over which bandwidth contracts might be traded. An important property
of the process is that it avoids introducing perverse incentives for a capacity
provider to increase congestion.
Keywords: Capacity Contracts; Congestion Pricing; Nash Equilibrium
Joint work of: Anderson, Edward; Kelly, Frank; Steinberg, Richard
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/204
The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost
Allocation
Eva Tardos (Cornell University, USA)
Given a collection of self-interested agents who want to form a network connect-
ing certain endpoints, the set of stable solutions  the Nash equilibria  may
look quite diﬀerent from the centrally enforced optimum. We study the quality
of the best Nash equilibrium, and refer to the ratio of its cost to the optimum
network cost as the price of stability. The best Nash equilibrium solution has a
natural meaning of stability in this context  it is the optimal solution that can
be proposed from which no user will "defect".
We consider the price of stability for network design with respect to one of
the most widely-studied protocols for network cost allocation, in which the cost
of each edge is divided equally between users whose connections make use of
it; this fair-division scheme can be derived from the Shapley value, and has a
number of basic economic motivations. We show that the price of stability for
network design with respect to this fair cost allocation is O(log k), where k is
the number of users, and that a good Nash equilibrium can be achieved via best-
response dynamics in which users iteratively defect from a starting solution. This
establishes that the fair cost allocation protocol is in fact a useful mechanism
for inducing strategic behavior to form near-optimal equilibria.
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See also: E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, J. Kleinberg, E. Tardos, T. Wexler and
T. Roughgerden. The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allo-
cation, Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS),
2004
Eﬃcient Learning Equilibrium
Moshe Tennenholtz (Technion - Haifa, IL)
We introduce eﬃcient learning equilibrium (ELE), a normative approach to
learning in non-cooperative settings. In ELE, the learning algorithms themselves
are required to be in equilibrium. In addition, the learning algorithms must ar-
rive at a desired value after polynomial time, and a deviation from the prescribed
ELE becomes irrational after polynomial time. We prove the existence of an ELE
(where the desired value is the social surplus of an optimal Nash equilibrium)
and of a Pareto-ELE (where the objective is the maximization of social surplus)
in repeated games with full monitoring. We also show that an ELE does not
always exist in the partial monitoring case; however, it does exist for symmetric
games. Finally, we discuss the extension of these results to general-sum stochastic
games.
Joint work of: Tennenholtz, Moshe; Brafman, Ronen
Agent-based Simulation in Electric Power- and
CO2-Emission-Certiﬁcate Markets
Daniel Veit (Universität Karlsruhe, D)
The liberalization of international power markets unleashed great new chances
but also risks for market participants. Industrial consumers are now able to cover
their demand trading at power exchanges and do no longer have to necessarily
negotiate long term agreements with power producers. On the other hand, pro-
ducers of power are able to sell their capacities at exchanges and thereby use
market mechanisms to determine prices of the electricity. Besides the liberaliza-
tion of power markets, the introduction of CO2-Emission-Certiﬁcate markets,
which regulate the amount of allowed emissions of CO2, inﬂuence the market
structure in the electric power domain.
Due to rapidly grown internet availability, in recent years power exchanges
based on electronic marketplaces for non storable goods have been established
(such as the European Energy Exchange, EEX in Leipzig). The market share of
these exchanges has strongly grown up to 20
Since this area is fairly new, the issue of our research is the identiﬁcation
of actually applied and possibly applicable market mechanisms for non storable
goods. Using these mechanisms, market situations are simulated and possible
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acting strategies upon these markets are determined. A key mean which can
be applied for the derivation of recommendations for acting strategies upon
such markets is simulation. One of the latest simulation methods is Agent-based
Computational Economics (ACE). ACE is using software agents to represent
market participants and makes them act on behalf of real market participants.
Depending on the market mechanism and the strategy as well as the learning
behavior of the agent a more or less successful participation in the market can
be observed.
The aim of this research is to develop and contribute to the mechanisms in
ACE, which are currently a lively research area. Additionally, the existing and
developed methods in ACE are to be applied in the domains of power and GRID
markets. ACE in power markets is the issue of the research project PowerACE
(www.powerace.de) funded by the VolkswagenStiftung, in which I am currently
involved.
Keywords: Agent-based Computational Economics, Agent-based Simulation,
Electric Power Markets, CO2-Emission-Certiﬁcate Markets
The bisection auction is the fastest Vickrey auction
Dries Vermeulen (Maastricht University, NL)
In this paper we show that for the case where two bidders have private values for
a single item the bisection auction is the stochastically dominant implementation
of the Vickrey auction. Consequently the bisection auction is also optimal from
a worst-case perspective and it has the lowest expected running time.
Keywords: Vickrey auction; binary search; stochastic dominance.
Joint work of: Grigorieva, Elena; Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Vermeulen, Dries;
Muller, Rudolf
Approximation Techniques for Utilitarian Mechanism
Design
Berthold Vöcking (RWTH Aachen, D)
In order to ensure incentive compatibility, approximation algorithms need to
satisfy certain monotonicity properties. Unfortunately, most of the known tech-
niques for designing approximation algorithms do not fulﬁll these properties. We
study alternative techniques that lead to monotone algorithms. For example, we
present an alternative method transforming a pseudopolynomial algorithm into
a monotone FPTAS. This method can be applied to various problems like, e.g.,
knapsack, constrained shortest path, or scheduling to minimize the weighted
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number of tardy jobs. The monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem is of
particular interest as it gives a very eﬃcient mechanism for multi-unit auctions.
The best previous result for this kind of auctions was a 2-approximation. The
transformation is based on an enumerative method that virtually enumerates
over an inﬁnite number of ways to round the coeﬃcients of the objective func-
tion. We also show how to enhance another enumeration technique and derive
a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any bounded
number of parameters per agent.
Furthermore, we also consider frugality aspects. In particular, we present
upper bounds on the diﬀerence between the payment made by an approximate
mechanism and the payment made by the exact VCG mechanism.
Combining these bounds, e.g., with our results for FPTASs, the overpayment
for eﬃciently computable mechanisms can be made arbitrarily small. This shows
that our FPTAS based mechanisms truly approximate the VCG mechanism both
with respect to the social objective and payment.
Keywords: Mechanism design, approximation algorithms
Joint work of: Vöcking, Berthold; Krysta, Piotr; Briest, Patrick
Incentive-Compatible, Budget-Balanced, yet Highly
Eﬃcient Auctions for Supply Chain Formation
William Walsh (IBM TJ Watson Research Center - Hawthorne, USA)
We address the mechanism design problem of supply chain formationthe prob-
lem of negotiation mechanisms to coordinate the buying and selling of goods in
multiple markets across a supply chain. Because eﬀective negotiation strategies
can be diﬃcult to design for supply chains, we focus on incentive compatible
auctions, in which the agents' dominant strategy is to simply report their pri-
vate information truthfully. Unfortunately, with two-sided negotiation, charac-
teristic of supply chains, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve perfect eﬃ-
ciency, budget balance, and individual rationality with incentive compatibility.
To resolve this problem we introduce auctions that explicitly discard proﬁtable
trades, thus giving up perfect eﬃciency to maintain budget balance, incentive
compatibility and individual rationality. We use a novel payment rule based on
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments, but adapted to our allocation rule. The ﬁrst
auction we present is incentive compatible when each agent desires only a single
bundle of goods, the auction correctly knows all agents' bundles of interest, but
the monetary valuations are private to the agents. We introduce extensions to
maintain incentive compatibility when the auction does not know the agents'
bundles of interest. We establish a good worst case bound on eﬃciency when the
bundles of interest are known, which also applies in some cases when the bun-
dles are not known. Our auctions produce higher eﬃciency for a broader class
of supply chains than any other incentive compatible, individually rational, and
budget-balanced auction we are aware of.
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Keywords: Auction, supply chain formation, mechanism design, combinatorial
exchange, incentive compatible
Joint work of: Babaioﬀ, Moshe; Walsh, William
Exploring Trading Strategy Spaces
Michael Wellman (University of Michigan, USA)
Given that the complexity of many market games precludes analytic charac-
terization of equilibrium, we require alternative means of evaluating strategic
alternatives. My group has been applying an empirical game-theoretic method-
ology to the study of several interesting market games, yielding insights into key
strategic issues as well as evidence bearing on particular strategies. Examples
include simultaneous auctions as well as two scenarios from the annual Trad-
ing Agent Competition: one in travel shopping and the other in supply chain
management.
A Network Approach to Bayes-Nash Incentive Compatible
Mechanisms
Sascha Wolf (Maastricht University, NL)
This paper provides a characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mech-
anisms in settings where agents have one-dimensional or multi-dimensional types,
quasi-linear utility functions and interdependent valuations. The characteriza-
tion is derived in terms of conditions for the underlying allocation function.
We do this by making a link to network theory and building complete directed
graphs for agents' type spaces. We show that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash
incentive compatible if and only if these graphs have no negative, ﬁnite cycles.
In the case of one-dimensional types and given certain properties for agents'
valuation functions, we show that this condition reduces to the absence of neg-
ative 2-cycles. In the case of multi-dimensional types and given a linearity re-
quirement on the valuation functions, we show that this condition reduces to
the absence of negative 2-cycles and an integratebility condition on the valua-
tion functions.
Keywords: Implementation, Mechanism Design, Multi-Dimensional Types
Joint work of: Müller, Rudolf; Perea, Andres; Wolf, Sascha
Full Paper: http://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2005/205
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Inner Approximations for Cones of Outer Normal
of Integer Programs with Application to Pricing in
Combinatorial Auctions
Sven de Vries (TU München, D)
For sensitivity analysis of linear programs it is important to know the cone of
outer normals of the linear program at an optimal solution. However, even when
knowing an optimal solution of an integer program, there is no cone of outer
normals readily available since the solution may not even be extremal for the
underlying lp-relaxation. Even for binary integer programs, where the optimal
ip-solution is extremal for the lp-relaxation, the cone of active constraints (that
is available) usually does not contain the objective function.
One way to overcome this, is to use a Gomory-type cutting plane algorithm
which generates enough hyperplanes to close the integrality-gap and makes the
optimal solution extremal (even for non-binary IP's) with respect to the aug-
mented formulation. This way was proposed by Gomory&Baumol (1960) and
used by de Vries and Vohra (2003) as a mean to obtain prices and a price based
mechanism for combinatorial auctions. However, as any practitioner of integer
programming knows, a pure cutting plane algorithm is seldomly deemed the
working horse of any actual solution algorithm for hard real world integer pro-
grams.
In the present study we describe how to use branch-and-bound-alike algo-
rithms to obtain an inner approximation of the cone of outer normals at the
optimal solution. This cone will turn out to contain the objective function in
its interior in generic situations. This permits again to introduce linear prices in
combinatorial auctions usually with less computational eﬀort than is required
to compute the shortfalls used sometimes to provide feedback in combinatorial
auctions.
(This is joint work with Oliver Bastert of Dash Optimization.)
Keywords: Cone of outer normals, stability in integer programming, pricing in
combinatorial auctions
Joint work of: de Vries, Sven; Bastert, Oliver
